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Abstract
In this paper, we examine external, monetary, and structural determinants of cross-
country variation in reserve volatility for 30 emerging market economies from 1973 to
2000. We find that reserve holdings and openness to be the most important determinants
of reserve volatility. These results are robust for a range of control variables, including
monetary variables, the degree of financial development, and the level of indebtedness.
We view these results as establishing interesting stylized facts that may be helpful in
evaluating reserve uncertainty as a crisis indicator.
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Introduction
The importance of reserve volatility arises frequently in policy discussions of
international finance. The buffer stock model first introduced by Frenkel and Jovanovic
(1981) and more recently re-examined by Flood and Marion (2001) show that a low weight
on reserve volatility reflects an inadequate level of foreign reserve holdings. In a different
context, Aizenman and Marion (1999) claim that reserve volatility can reduce
international credit if investors become more pessimistic about a country's reserve
position. Reserve volatility is also used to identify events or regimes. Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) construct a index of currency market turbulence measured as a weighted
average of exchange rate changes and reserve changes, where reserve volatility enters as a
weight for reserve loss. Alternatively, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (1999) rely on reserve volatility to determine whether the official
classifications of a country's exchange rate arrangement provides an adequate
representation of actual country practice.
 Up until now, the recent empirical studies operating with reserve volatility
concentrate on the indicator properties of reserve volatility as a signal for identifying
future crises episodes. Examples include Aizenman and Marion (1999) and Calvo and
Reinhart (2002). The analysis is largely short-run and the focus is frequently on individual
countries with a known history of currency crises. Missing in the empirical literature on
reserve volatility is a long-run perspective that tries to understand the cross-country
differences in reserve volatility.
A plot of the monthly percentage change in foreign exchange reserves of twelve
leading emerging market countries in Figure 1 reveals that it is difficult to make
generalizations about reserve volatility across countries. The largest fluctuations between
1973-2000 are not always concentrated around the time of well-known episodes such as
the Asian Crisis of 1997. Nor is it clear whether the fluctuations have increased or
decreased over the three decades. From a cross-country perspective, it is of interest to3
learn whether structural factors are responsible for the differing behavior in reserve
volatility or whether it is simply noise.
1
The objective of the paper is to determine the long-run forces determining reserve
volatility in a cross-country setup. The focus is on emerging market economies; countries
that have experienced large fluctuations in capital flows. A wide range of potential
indicators stemming from the currency crisis literature is considered for the 1973-2000
period. In particular, we are interested whether specific groups of variables (i.e., external,
monetary or structural) account for the cross-country differences in reserve volatility.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the implications of
reserve volatility for emerging market economies. In particular, it discusses theoretical
and empirical priors about reserve volatility. Section 2 outlines the empirical strategy:
measures of reserve volatility, the economic determinants of reserve volatility, and the
empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the main cross-country findings. Section 4
considers alternative specifications and extensions to test the robustness of the empirical
findings from section 3. Section 5 concludes.
1. Reserve Volatility and Their Theoretical Priors
While there are an infinite number of channels that can generate fluctuations in
reserve holdings, to our knowledge there is no explicit theoretical model that seeks to
explain reserve volatility as a macroeconomic policy objective.
2 Moreover, central banks
have been quiet as to how reserve volatility should behave. The smoothing or
                                        
1 Several studies including Neely (2000) and Lee (1997) suggest that reserves are an imperfect proxy for
foreign exchange interventions or other transactions such as government payment of debt denominated in
foreign currency.
2 The strategic objectives for reserve management are generally defined as maximizing returns subject to the
maintenance of sufficient security of the assets and adequate liquidity for meeting the calls on reserves, see
Nugée (2000). Studies by Kouri and de Macado (1978), Ben-Bassat (1980), and Dellas and Yoo (1991) have
compared the reserve currency preferences of central banks for individual countries to models that minimize
the variance of the portfolio return for a given mean rate of return. These studies have a serious
shortcoming in that they do not consider important benchmark decisions undertaken by the reserve manager
(i.e., the duration of an asset or the reference currency).4
minimization of reserve volatility is not regarded to be an objective of central banks.
3
Reserve volatility enters, however, as a contributing factor in various theoretical and
empirical models. These are briefly outlined below.
Theoretical Links
One linkage of reserve volatility is to determine the optimal size of a country's
international reserves. The buffer stock model of Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) says that
central banks choose an optimal level of reserves to balance the macroeconomic
adjustment costs incurred in the absence of reserves with the opportunity cost of holding
reserves. In the special case of no reserve drift between stock adjustments, a Taylor-series
approximation of optimal reserve holdings with the log transformation yields the
following equation for reserves:
lnRES0 = c0 + 0.5lnσ =− =0.25lnr, (1)
where RES0 is the optimal starting level for international reserves after restocking, c0 is a
country specific nominal constant, σ =is the standard deviation of the Wiener increment in
the reserves (time series) process operating between stock adjustments, and r is the
opportunity cost of holding reserves. The optimal stock of reserves yields the optimal
combination of being able to finance a deficit by drawing on reserves and of having to
adjust in the face of a deficit by reducing expenditures relative to income. Higher reserve
volatility means that reserves hit their lower bound more frequently. The monetary
authority is therefore willing to restock a larger amount of reserves and tolerate greater
opportunity costs to incur the adjustment cost less frequently.
An alternative channel involving reserve volatility is through signaling. Moral
hazard problems linked with domestic bailouts and credit availability have been cited by
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998) and others as an important determinant of the Asian
financial crisis. Aizenman and Marion (1999) show that reserve uncertainty can have
                                        
3 Central banks, in rare instances, set guidelines to motivate their demand for reserves. The Guidotti plan,
for example, sought to set reserves at a level equivalent to a year's interest payment on foreign debt. See
the Report of the Working Group on Transparency and Accountability (1998).
www.ustres.gov/press/releases/docs/g22-wg1.htm. Alternatively, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand sets
reserves at 10 weeks of imports (see Sherwin, 2000).5
nonlinear effects on the supply of credit for an emerging market economy. The authors
assume that the private sector believes the domestic authority of an emerging market
country will use its international reserves to bailout lenders. When the expected reserve
position of an emerging market economy is large relative to the potential bailout in bad
states of nature, reserve volatility does not matter. However, the same level of reserve
volatility can cause a large reduction in the supply of international credit if the emerging
market's foreign debt is large enough or if the collapse of output forces the private sector
to downgrade its priors about repayment possibilities.
A further use of reserve volatility is to identify an exchange rate system. Pegged
exchange-rate arrangements have been blamed for many of the currency crises in the last
decade. Adherents of this view argue that emerging market economies should allow their
currency to float freely. To test whether countries are doing what they are professing,
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Reinhart (2002) analyze the behavior of exchange rates,
international reserves and monetary aggregates within a simple open economy model. A
symptom of 'fear of floating', (i.e, saying that a country allows their exchange rate to
float, but does not,) is identified with high reserve volatility.
Each of the above linkages assume that the monetary authority exercises
considerable control over its reserves and reserve volatility. Others such as Lee (1997)
argue that the opposite is closer to the truth. Monetary authorities of emerging market
economies do not possess the necessary open market instruments to sterilize reserves
when inflation or money growth is their policy objective. This is because their financial
markets are under developed. Supplementary tools, which include tightening the access of
banks at the discount window, adjusting reserve requirements or the placement of
government deposits, and using foreign exchange swap facility, yield the same effect as
an open market operation. In practice, however, reserves become noisier and their
interpretation more difficult.
Empirical Stylized Facts and Considerations
Flood and Marion (2001) and Lane and Burke (2001) offer recent cross-country
evidence on reserve holdings that have relevance for the empirical specification of reserve
volatility. Both studies consider industrial and non-industrial countries for relatively long6
time periods. The first study, restricting itself to the buffer stock framework of Frenkel and
Jovanovic (1981), finds that reserve volatility is the only significant variable. Different
measures of opportunity cost have little or no explanatory power. The second study does
not consider reserve volatility among its list of potential variables and finds that openness
is the most important contributing factor for reserve demand. For our purposes, it is of
interest to determine whether the combination of openness and reserves unfolds any
alternative linkages with reserve volatility.
An alternative channel that needs to be considered is the role of financial
development. Recent studies by Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) and Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) emphasize the interaction between currency crises and banking crises. The "twin
crises" arise as a result of an internal or external shock that is amplified and propagated
to the rest of the economy by liquidity creating financial intermediaries. The
intermediaries generate large capital inflows, and at the same time, augment the risk of
large capital outflows. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show empirically that the twin crises
have their origin in the deregulation of the financial system. Financial liberalization is
followed by a rapid increase in the M2 multiplier and in credit growth. Kaminsky and
Reinhart (1999) and Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) also show that this trend in the financial
variables reverses abruptly before the outbreak of the currency crisis.
This last linkage underscores the view that the currency crises of the 1990s are
fundamentally different from earlier periods. Feldstein (2002), Perrault (2002) and others
note the evolution of different banking channels and private capital flows between the
1970s and 1990s. First, private capital flows to the emerging market countries were
concentrated in Latin America in the 1970s and the 1980s. During the 1990s, the
emerging market economies in Asia and Europe were the new destinations. Second, high
expected returns on investment motivated capital flows to emerging market countries. In
the 1990s, these flows were boosted by economic and financial liberalization, perceived
sound macroeconomic policies and, in some cases, explicit or implicit government
guarantees. These recent developments suggest strongly that it is important even in a
cross-country context to account for shifts in the potential linkages over time.7
2. Empirical Specifications, Data and Selected Variables
Sample
There is considerable controversy as to what constitutes an emerging market
economy. Definitions vary considerably and few studies motivate their selection. Our
selection was guided by two considerations that are independent of the occurrence of a
crisis episode. The first was data availability that covered the post-Bretton Woods period
from 1973 to 2000. This eliminated many of the so-called economies in transition,
creating a geographical vacuum for Eastern Europe. The second consideration was based
on investment opportunities in the non-industrialized world. This is indirectly measured
by foreign direct investment (FDI). Our selected sample of emerging market economies
was thus defined as the top 30 non-industrialized countries that received FDI from 1973
to 2000. A list of the countries included in the sample can be found in Appendix A1.
Our sample size of 30 countries is set arbitrary. Most empirical studies work with a
smaller number of countries. However, because our estimation strategy is cross country
with many control variables, we are forced to extend the sample to allow for a reasonable
number of degrees of freedom. Figure 2 highlights in black our sample of emerging market
economies with respect to (natural log) total FDI from 1973 to 2000.
4 To see whether our
selected sample is fairly robust to different standards, Figures 3 and 4 plot the same
countries from Figure 2 with respect to (natural log) GDP and (natural log) GDP per capita.
The same countries marked in black do not give a unanimous reading. They do, however,
suggest that size may be an important criterion.
Econometric Model
We estimate a cross-sectional specification using data averaged over different time
periods. The motivation for the estimation strategy rests in investigating whether
external, monetary, and structural determinants of cross-country variation are important
in explaining reserve volatility. Thus, we intentionally abstract from the cyclical
fluctuations in reserves marked by particular episodes in capital flows or speculative
                                        
4 The sample based on FDI is dictated to a large extent by the decade 1991 to 2000. If we consider only the
1990s, only two countries from our sample would not appear.8
attacks. The cross-country specification follows Flood and Marion (2001) and Lane and
Burke (2001) in their studies for the level of reserves and is defined as
Vol(RESi) = α  + β Zi + ε i, (2)
where Vol(RESi) is the reserve volatility of country i, Zi is a set of control variables and ε i
is the error term. Estimation is by OLS with heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West
consistent covariances.
The variables in equation (2) are averaged over three periods: 1973-1980, 1981-
1990 and 1991-2000. The division into decade averages is motivated by the prevailing
view that the currency crises of the 1990s are fundamentally different from earlier periods
(see Feldstein 2002). To determine whether this has an impact on reserve volatility,
estimates for the three decades are presented in section 3.
Reserve Volatility
The international reserve holdings of a country in this study are defined in terms
of foreign exchange. Although it is common to work with the sum of gold, SDRs, foreign
exchange, and reserve position in the Fund, the most important variable in terms of size
and international following is by far foreign exchange reserves. This variable is
denominated in end-of-period U.S. dollars.
5 Hereafter, when we refer to reserves, we mean
foreign exchange reserves.
Two measures of reserve volatility based on standard deviations are constructed.
The first is the monthly change in reserves, whereas the second is closer to the definition
used by Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) and is the monthly deviation from a Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) trend. Individual country holdings of reserves cannot be compared or traced
through time unless they are scaled in some way to reflect differences in size. Our choice
is to scale reserves by GDP.
6 Thus, we define the two volatilities for country i as Vol1i =
                                        
5 Preliminary estimates of the individual components of foreign reserves showed large differences with
foreign exchange reserves offering the most promising results.
6 Recently, Flood and Marion (2001) in their empirical study of the buffer stock model investigate several
scaling methods. Their results are found to be independent of such transformations.9
ln(std.dev(∆ Resi,t)/ave(GDPi)) and Vol2i = ln(std.dev(HPtrendi,t - Resi,t)/ave(GDPi)), where
Resi,t denotes reserves and t time (in months).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the level of reserves, standard deviation
of the monthly change in reserves, and the standard deviation of the monthly deviation
from the HP trend. These natural log transformed variables are not scaled by GDP. Two
results stand out. First, the average volatility of reserves (i.e., measured by the standard
deviation) for the emerging market sample increased the most over the three decades
when compared to the group of industrialized and developing countries. Second, the
volatility measures for the emerging market economies do not suffer from excess skewness
and kurtosis; a result that underpins our estimation procedure.
Control Variables
The currency crisis literature identifies numerous control variables that may
influence reserves and reserve volatility. Because there is no agreement on the theoretical
model of reserve volatility, a broad approach is taken by considering a large number of
potential empirical determinants. Definitions and sources of the variables are given in
Appendix A2.
Our control variables can be grouped into three broad categories: external,
monetary, and structural. The classification of the determinants into groups is somewhat
vague. Our intention is to determine whether a particular group of variables is more
closely associated with reserve volatility. The external determinants are macroeconomic
variables that are strongly influenced by foreign developments or shocks from abroad.
These variables include the level of reserves, foreign direct investment, the current and
capital account, and debt variables. The classification of reserves as external is without
contention. There are numerous reasons for holding reserves, yet almost all are related to
concerns regarding foreign shocks.
Monetary variables are defined to be instruments that are under the direct control
of the monetary authority. These variables include interest rates, exchange rates, and
their volatility. Included in this group are capital controls and the IMF's classification of
exchange rate systems, both are taken from Cotterelli and Giannini (1997). The impact of10
these two policy variables is ambiguous.
7 On the one hand, a flexible exchange rate
system or a high level of capital controls may reduce the risk of a speculative attack,
reducing the need to hold reserves. On the other hand, capital controls may prevent
access to external credit sources, increasing the importance of reserves in financing
external transactions. In the case of the exchange rate system, the classification may be
unimportant if the monetary authorities are unable to sterilize the purchase of domestic
currency due to a weak financial system.
The control variables that fall into the group structural are GDP per capita,
population density, openness, corruption, central bank independence, country credit
rating, and financial development (i.e. M2/GDP, insurance premium/GDP and insurance
premium/population). Structural variables reflect in part institution building (i.e., central
bank independence corruption and country credit rating) that are viewed to be important
for a country's long-run development. In the same spirit, political stability is captured
through the country credit rating.
3. Cross Country Results
This section presents the cross-country estimates of reserve volatility for the
periods 1973-1980, 1981-1990, and 1991-2000. Because we are considering a large
number of potential determinants of reserve volatility and the sample of emerging market
economies is limited to 30 countries, it is necessary to devise an empirical strategy that
maintained a respectable number of degrees of freedom. The selection strategy first
examined the regressions between reserve volatility and individual determinants. If a
variable was not significant at the 5% level (without additional control variables) with
reserve volatility, it was thrown out. In many cases this reduced considerably the number
of variables. The second phase of the bottom-up strategy looked at whether the variables
in consideration remained significant with other control variables. This strategy was
                                        
7 As noted in Lane and Burke (2001) in the case of reserves, the monetary variables may be regarded as
endogenous. Yet, we do not believe that the monetary variables are strongly influenced by reserve volatility
over the longer horizon.11
continued for higher combinations of variables until a satisfactory specification was
found.
The search was simplified in that two variables (i.e., reserves and openness) were
able to explain a large share of the cross-country differences in reserve volatility. Tables
2-5, which summarize the empirical results, show only the regressions of those variables
that were significant with reserve volatility in the first phase of the estimation strategy
(i.e., significant variables in a regression for reserve volatility without additional control
variables). The constant, which is included in each of the regressions, is not shown in the
tables. Because the empirical results are dominated by the inclusion of (the level of)
reserves, the discussion of the empirical results is divided into two parts: estimates with
and without reserves.
Reserve Volatility and Reserves
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the cross-country results for the two reserve volatility
measures Vol1 and Vol2 with reserves. The bottom up strategy yielded a parsimonious
specification for reserve volatility. The final specifications were dominated by two or three
variables. The control variables that were significant in the specification search were
correctly signed with the priors, except openness defined by import-GDP ratio for the
1973-1980 period. For this particular period, the import-GDP ratio was found to be
negatively correlated with reserve volatility. The Frankel and Romer index was found to be
a better proxy for openness for the 1973-1980 period, whereas the opposite applied for
the import-GDP ratio when considering the later decades.
The first phase of the specification strategy was dominated by external and
structural variables. In particular, openness, FDI, and total debt/GDP were found to be
significant for both volatility measures covering all periods. None of the financial
development variables and monetary variables has a p-value lower than 0.05 for more than
one time period.
The second and final round results for the two volatility measures yield similar
findings for the three time periods. The first finding is that the level of reserves
dominates all other explanatory variables. Reserves explain between 50% and 70% of the12
cross-country differences in reserve volatility. This result says that a country with a high
level of reserves is expected to experience greater reserve volatility. The importance of
reserves comes as no surprise when comparing the risk minimization model of Ben-Bassat
(1980) and the reverse causality results from Flood and Marion (2001) with the buffer
stock specification for industrial and non-industrial countries. It thus appears that the
interdependence of reserve's first two moments is not specific to emerging market
countries.
The second finding is that monetary variables and variables proxying financial
development do not enter the final cross-country specification. Monetary variables such as
exchange rate volatility and interest rate volatility are never significant with reserve
volatility for the three periods. Other variables that demonstrate a weak correlation with
reserve volatility (i.e., significant in the first phase for a single decade, but not with
other control variables), are central bank independence, financial development (i.e.,
proxied by M2/GDP and the amount of insurance premias/GDP), short-term debt,
population density, and exchange rate arrangement, and country credit ratings.
The third finding is that the empirical specifications for the 1990s differs with
respect to the earlier periods. Reserves as an explanatory variable do not explain reserve
volatility to the same extent as in the earlier decades. The R
2s are lower for the 1990s. Of
greater interest is the significance of other variables in the specification for the 1990s.
First, openness is significant for both measures of reserve volatility.
 As expected a higher
degree of openness is correlated with higher levels of reserve volatility. Second, total
debt, M2/GDP, and country credit ratings are found to be significant for the 1990s in the
regressions for Vol1.
Reserve Volatility without Reserves
The empirical results in Table 2 to 5 may be criticized on the grounds of reverse
causality in equation (1). While we do not have a direct test for the simultaneity problem,
two routes are taken to tackle this issue. The first is to offer empirical results without
reserves and to determine whether our previous findings still hold. The second is to
consider alternative measures of reserve volatility that adjust for reserves and test for the
significance of reserves as a control variable.13
Tables 4 and 5 present cross-country results without reserves as an economic
determinant of reserve volatility. Unlike the earlier regressions summarized by Tables 2
and 3, the regressions without reserves do not yield uniform results for Vol1 and Vol2.
Openness is the only variable to enter significantly in all the regressions. In fact for the
regressions based on Vol2, openness is the only variable that is significant. Instead in the
case for Vol1, we find that GDP per capita is an important determinant of reserve volatility
for the 1981-1990 period and FDI and country credit ratings matter for the 1991-2000
period. Again monetary and financial variables do not enter the final cross-country
specification.
An alternative way to understand the influence of reserves in the tables 2 to 5 is
to adjust Vol1 for average reserves i.e., Vol1* = ln(std. dev.(∆ RESi)/ave(RESi)ave.(GDPi))
and Vol1** = ln(std. dev.(∆ RESi)/ave(∆ ln RESi)ave.(GDPi)). The two definitions of volatility
embed a standard volatility measure with average reserves and their change. The latter
definition may be interpreted as an inverse sharp ratio, which attempts to adjust a return
by its risk. To see whether the specifications of Table 2 are robust to these alternative
measures of reserve volatility, the same regressions were rerun with Vol1* and Vol1**.
8
The results (not shown) find that reserves remain significant for each of the three sample
periods, apart from Vol1** for the 1980s. The result that countries with higher reserve
levels observe higher reserve volatility holds also for Vol1* and Vol1**. The other findings
that financial variables and monetary variables do not matter and that the specification
for the 1990s differs from the earlier periods holds.
4. Extensions to the Cross Country Results
To determine the robustness of our empirical results in the previous section,
several modifications are undertaken. In particular, we explore several channels that
attempt to shed light on why the monetary and financial variables are unable to explain
reserve volatility when using a long-run framework.
                                        
8 The regression results are available upon request.14
Crisis Episodes
An alternative consideration is to give greater weight to financial liberalization
and banking crises. Studies by Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) and Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999) stress that intermediation acts as a propagation mechanism stimulating both
capital inflows and outflows. While we find little evidence that financial development
matters for reserve volatility, the linkages between banking and currency crises and
reserve volatility were not explored in section 3. We rely on two sources for our crisis
indexes. The first is the Kaminsky-Reinhart index of currency market turbulence, which is
based on monthly changes in the exchange rate and in reserves. This index is constructed
mechanically such that
+1 when |It -  I |/σ I > 3 where It = ∆ et/et-1 - α∆ RESt/RESt-1
and α  = σ e/σ RES,
             0 otherwise,
where σ  denotes the standard deviation, et the exchange rate and RES reserves.
9 The
second source is from Glick and Hutchison (1999). They provide dates of banking, currency
and twin crisis for the years 1975 to 1997.
Table 6 presents the results for the crisis indexes with Vol1. The control variables
are again reserves and openness. Overall, the evidence is weak at best that crisis episodes
influence reserve volatility in cross-country regressions. The indexes are almost always
insignificant with or without the control variables and the coefficients have no clear
pattern. This result holds for all time periods and is independent of the type of index.
Exchange Rate Regimes: de jure versus de facto Classifications
The empirical analysis for exchange rate regimes in section 3 relied on the IMF de
jure classification based on the regime that governments claim to have. The empirical
results were negative with this variable. Many countries, however, in theory follow flexible
regimes, but intervene in the foreign exchange rate market to such an extent that in
                                        
9 Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) filter the data for high inflation periods. Our procedure sets the threshold
level for a crisis from 3 to 4 when inflation is more than 150% during a six-month period.15
practice makes them indistinguishable from fixed rate regimes. To address this problem we
use a de facto classification of exchange rate regimes constructed by Levy Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (1999). The authors use cluster analysis to group different regimes according
to movements in the nominal exchange rate, changes in the nominal exchange rate, and
changes in international reserves. The index has four classifications (floating = 1, dirty =
2, crawling peg =3, and fixed = 4) for each year from 1990 to 1998.
The cross-country results with the two exchange rate classifications are given in
Table 7. The empirical results show that the index for de facto classifications is possibly
an important determinant of reserve volatility, whereas the index for de jure classification
is not. The evidence suggests that de facto exchange rate regimes which require more
interventions are positively correlated with reserve volatility. The regressions with the IMF
(de jure) index, summarized in Table 7a, are insignificant and in almost all cases are
incorrectly signed. Moreover the results for reserves and openness are not influenced by
the presence of the IMF index. The results with the Levy Yeyati-Sturzenegger (de facto)
index, given in Table 7b, show a different picture. This exchange rate index is significant
at the 5% level for Vol1 in each of the regressions, whereas the evidence for Vol2 is less
conclusive. More importantly, the coefficients on the de facto index are all correctly
signed, i.e., the greater is the commitment to defend a given value for the exchange; the
larger is reserve volatility. Of further note is the observation that openness is no longer
significant when the Levy Yeyati-Sturzenegger index enters the cross-country regressions.
Panel Estimation
A further possibility why the financial and monetary variables are insignificant in
the cross-country regressions is simply that key episodes get washed out through
averaging. Although our primary focus is on identifying the long-run determinants of
reserve volatility, we rely on panel estimates to separate better the short- and long-run
influences of monetary variables on reserve volatility. Panel estimation allows crises
episodes to have a stronger impact on reserve volatility, enabling a comparison with the
earlier cross-country estimates. The annual panel uses the same variables from section 3
along with the de facto classifications and the crisis indexes from Tables 6 and 7. The
same bottom-up strategy from section 3 is applied to the panel estimates.16
The (unbalanced) panel estimates for fixed and random effects are given in Table
8. The table shows only the variables that are significant when no control variables
(reserves and openness) are considered. Among the significant variables in the first phase
of the estimation strategy are several monetary (i.e., the crisis indexes, interest rate
volatility, exchange rate volatility) and financial development (i.e., M2/GDP) variables
that were insignificant in the cross-country regressions. These variables are significant at
the 5% level both for the fixed effects and random effects specification. Of interest is the
observation that the debt variables did not figure in the final specifications. Next, when
the significant variables are regressed with the control variables reserves and
imports/GDP, we find that all the monetary variables remain significant along with the
current account and the country credit rating. The financial development variables are,
however, no longer significant in the second estimation phase. This is also true for FDI
and the absolute change in exports.
To determine whether a particular monetary variable or a crisis index stands out,
individual variables were juxtaposed to those given in equation (10) (i.e., reserves,
openness and the Kaminsky - Reinhart index). This specification was found to explain
reserve volatility the best. No other contributing determinants were found to be
significant in this specification. From this evidence, we conclude that the Kaminsky -
Reinhart index is highly correlated with a short-run but not a long-run measure of reserve
volatility.
5. Summary and Policy Implications
The importance of reserve volatility has entered in different policy discussions
surrounding the Asian crisis. Much of the analysis is primarily short run and centers on the
signaling ability of reserve volatility to identify specific episodes. Instead the objective of
this paper is to ask whether structural determinants are important in explaining cross-
country variation in reserve volatility. The question is of relevance because structural
variables such as openness are generally not considered in Levy Yeyati-Sturzenegger17
(1999) or Calvo and Reinhart (2000) when making comparative statements about a
country's fluctuations in reserves.
While openness is found to be an important structural variable for explaining
reserve volatility, three empirical regularities intertwined with this variable emerge from
our cross-country estimates. The first is that reserve volatility is largely explained by two
variables: the level of reserves and the degree of openness. Both of these long-run
variables are positively correlated with reserve volatility and explain between 50% and
70% of the cross -country differences in reserve volatility. These results are indirectly
supportive of other cross-country studies seeking to uncover the determinants of the
average level of reserves. The buffer stock studies by Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) and
others find that the first and second moment of reserves are highly correlated with each
other, whereas Lane and Burke (2001) stress the importance of openness in explaining a
country's reserves. The second finding underscores the observation of Feldstein (2002)
that the decade of the 1990s is distinct from earlier periods. In particular, we find that
long-term debt and the inverse of M2 velocity matter for reserve volatility for the 1990s.
The third finding is that we find no strong evidence that monetary variables (i.e.,
exchange rate volatility, the average interest rate, and capital controls) matter for
explaining cross-country differences in reserve volatility. This last finding needs to be
qualified in that the role of de facto as opposed to de jure exchange rate classifications is
found to be a potential contributor of reserve volatility. For the 1990s, we find evidence
for one measure of reserve volatility that de facto and not de jure exchange rate
classifications are significant.
The empirical findings allow us to make several observations, which are relevant
for the policy discussion of currency crises. To understand reserve volatility and its
indicator properties one must be careful when making short-run and long-run
comparisons. Crisis episodes, whether defined as banking or currency crises, are not found
to be a contributing factor for reserve volatility over longer time periods. Panel estimates
using annual data show that monetary variables along with several crisis indexes enter as
important short-run determinants of reserve volatility. However, the type of de facto
exchange rate regime, which has a more permanent fixture, has a stronger influence on18
long-run reserve volatility. These issues are important for the arguments put forth by
Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (1999) and others that a
country's over reliance of a pegged exchange rate is an explanation for credibility
problems specific to emerging market economies that exhibit high reserve volatility. Our
empirical results show further that one needs to take into account the size of a country's
reserves and the degree of openness regardless when making short and long-run
comparisons about a countries exchange rate regime based on reserve volatility.19
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Appendix
A1. Country Sample
Emerging Market Countries: Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Chile, China, Hongkong,
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South
Africa, Thailand, Trinidad Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela.
Industrial Countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA.
Developing Countries: Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cap Verde, Central Africa, Chad, Comoros,
Congo Republic, Cote d`Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Dominica, El Salvador,
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Oman,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Samoa, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri




Short-term debt is the natural log of average short-term debt in percent of total
debt. (Source World Bank (2001) Global Development Finance CD-Rom ).
Total debt is the natural log of average total debt divided by average GNP. (Source
World Bank (2001) Global Development Finance CD-Rom ).
Foreign direct investment is defined as the natural log of average foreign direct
investment divided by average GDP. (Source IMF line 78bed).
Current account is defined as the natural log of average current account divided by
average GDP. (Source IMF line 78ald).
Capital account is defined as the natural log of average capital account divided by
average GDP. (Source IMF line 78bcd).
Country credit rating is from Institutional Investor for years 1980, 1985, 1990,
1995, 2001.
Export volatility is defined as ln(std. dev(∆ Exports)/ave(GDP)). (Source IMF lines
70, 99bc).
Monetary Variables
Interest rate is the average three-month interest rate (i.e., ln(ave ii,t). The
frequency is monthly (Source IMF line 60c).22
Interest rate volatility is defined as the natural logarithm of the standard deviation
of the monthly change in the three-month interest rate over time (i.e., ln(std. dev(∆ ii,t)).
(Source IMF line 60c).
Exchange rate volatility is defined as logarithm of the standard deviation of the
monthly change in the exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar (i.e.ln(std. dev(∆
si,t)). (Source IMF line rf).
Capital controls index is taken from Cottarelli and Giannini (1997). The index is an
average over the different periods.
Exchange rate system index is +1 for fixed and 0 for flexible exchange rate systems.
The index, which is an average over the different periods, is taken from Cottarelli and
Giannini (1997).
Structural Variables
GDP per capita is ln(ave GDP/ave Population). (Source IMF line 99b.c, 99z).
Population density is specified as ln(ave Population/country size).
Openness is defined in two ways. The first uses the Frankel-Romer index (1999)
denoted as Openness (fr) in the tables. This captures the natural level of trade openness
by using the sum of the predicted bilateral trade shares from the geographical
determinants in a gravity model. The measure is the ratio imports to GDP, which is
defined as the natural log of average imports over average GDP. This variable is denoted
as Openness (Import/GDP) in the tables. (Source IMF line 71, 99bc).
Financial Development is measured in two ways. The first uses M2/GDP (source IMF
line 35, 99b. The second is proxied by the insurance premium density and insurance
premium penetration. Economies with a high insurance premium volume are likely to have
a rather high level of development. Premium density is defined as premium volume per
capita, whereas premium penetration is the premium volume in percentage of GDP.
Premium density and penetration are both published yearly by Swiss Re`s research
department.
Central bank independence, both indexes for non industrial countries are taken from
Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al. (1992).































































































1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
South Africa






























































Figure 4: Non Industrialized Countries and GDP per capita
Figure 3: Non Industrialized Countries and GDP
Figure 2: Non Industrialized Countries and Foreign Direct Investment
Countries
Countries25
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variable
Emerging Markets Industrial Countries Developing Countries
Level of Reserves 73-80 81-90 91-00 73-80 81-90 91-00 73-80 81-90 91-00
Mean 21.0921 21.6746 22.9287 21.7293 22.4690 23.2536 18.2053 18.4003 19.4717
Weighted Mean 21.7015 22.1763 23.8348 22.2719 23.6556 24.5463 17.2509 17.1944 18.9412
Maximum 23.5377 23.9247 25.1713 24.1525 24.5638 25.8133 21.0224 21.9934 22.7916
Minimum 19.7031 19.9603 20.0286 18.2827 16.8297 16.9046 15.0999 14.6390 14.7452
Standard Deviation 1.0076 1.0647 1.3344 1.2891 1.7122 1.7983 1.3893 1.6136 1.5604
Skewness 0.3017 0.2377 -0.3795 -0.5268 -1.7262 -2.1651 -0.0924 0.0149 -0.2674
Kurtosis 2.4943 2.2103 2.3983 3.7197 6.4957 8.3159 2.5543 2.6644 3.3193




73-80 81-90 91-00 73-80 81-90 91-00 73-80 81-90 91-00
Mean 18.7110 19.3228 20.1387 19.4020 20.1691 20.6346 16.2905 16.5714 17.1622
Weighted Mean 19.3671 19.1024 20.9191 20.3055 20.9519 21.5599 15.5971 15.5358 16.8523
Maximum 20.8768 21.1499 21.9578 21.1559 21.4446 22.6708 18.8684 19.5700 22.8050
Minimum 17.3563 17.9887 17.7929 16.1116 17.1156 14.3273 12.9638 14.0276 14.5304
Standard Deviation 0.8207 0.7637 1.0393 1.2062 0.9643 1.6886 1.1824 1.2336 1.4200
Skewness 0.7152 0.2685 -0.3598 -0.7588 -1.2321 -2.5377 -0.4725 -0.0807 0.7094
Kurtosis 3.2150 2.8585 2.6570 3.6405 5.5693 9.9363 3.4920 2.6250 5.3865





73-80 81-90 91-00 73-80 81-90 91-00 73-80 81-90 91-00
Mean 19.4297 20.0205 20.7795 19.9722 20.7965 21.3656 16.8219 17.1356 17.5601
Weighted Mean 20.1741 20.5332 21.6137 20.9588 21.8928 21.8578 14.6668 15.1334 17.1690
Maximum 21.6706 21.5733 22.6420 21.7732 22.4008 23.3163 19.4574 19.5033 22.4362
Minimum 18.1161 18.3441 18.2396 16.6777 17.2963 17.8656 13.3641 14.3938 14.6982
Standard Deviation 0.9679 0.8445 1.0989 1.2830 1.1412 1.0890 1.1549 1.1357 1.4569
Skewness 0.7890 0.1760 -0.4119 -0.6211 -1.0337 -1.2473 -0.5074 -0.1848 0.2886
Kurtosis 2.6269 2.4150 3.0320 3.1034 5.0901 6.3186 3.8377 2.8814 3.8156
Observations 25 28 30 22 22 22 47 51 64
Note: The variables are in US dollars and are not scaled by GDP.
         Countries are listed in the Appendix A1.26
Table 2a
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country




























































2 0.688 0.681 0.736 0.687 0.517 0.624 0.568 0.693 0.631 0.720 0.694 0.574
degrees of freedom 24 23 23 23 15 16 8 23 21 21 23 19
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.27
Table 2b
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country




















































































2 0.659 0.665 0.734 0.724 0.691 0.670 0.712 0.719 0.731 0.678 0.634
degrees of freedom 27 26 26 25 20 19 9 20 24 18 18
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.28
Table 2c
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country










































































2 0.504 0.610 0.599 0.620 0.615 0.639 0.596 0.594 0.598 0.672
degrees of freedom 28 27 26 26 21 20 20 19 20 26
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.29
Tabele 3a
Reserve Volatility - Vol2 (deviation from Hodrick Prescott trend) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country


















































2 0.616 0.598 0.642 0.604 0.394 0.424 0.541 0.664 0.568 0.549
degrees of freedom 22 21 21 21 14 15 7 21 20 17
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.30
Table 3b
Reserve Volatility - Vol2 (deviation from Hodrick Prescott trend) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country























































2 0.527 0.520 0.514 0.544 0.461 0.299 0.674 0.532 0.563 0.565 0.509
degrees of freedom 26 25 25 25 21 20 10 25 21 21 25
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.31
Table 3c


























































2 0.507 0.674 0.492 0.682 0.692 0.668 0.693 0.667 0.695
degrees of freedom 28 27 27 26 26 26 25 26 26
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.32
Table 4a
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country

















































2 0.327 0.261 0.413 0.665 0.349 0.329 0.346 0.273 0.199
degrees of freedom 23 15 16 8 23 21 21 23 19
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.33
Table 4b



























































2 0.546 0.598 0.483 0.463 0.547 0.530 0.439 0.456
degrees of freedom 26 21 20 10 21 25 19 19
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.34
Table 4c













































2 0.549 0.560 0.187 0.464 0.534 0.512 0.517 0.557
degrees of freedom 27 27 22 27 27 26 27 27
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.35
Table 5a








































2 0.257 0.096 -0.019 0.224 0.321 0.155 0.149
degrees of freedom 21 14 15 7 21 20 17
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.36
Table 5b













































2 0.337 0.231 0.235 0.450 0.358 0.236 0.220 0.267
degrees of freedom 25 21 20 10 25 21 21 25
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.37
Table 5c








































2 0.623 0.673 0.653 0.623 0.622 0.623 0.631
degrees of freedom 27 27 27 27 26 27 27
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.38
Table 6a
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country














































(GH) Banking Crisis Index
(GH) Twin Crisis Index
adj. R
2 -0.023 0.637 0.687 0.047 0.267 -0.252 0.617 0.668 0.091 0.241
degrees of freedom 23 22 21 22 22 19 18 17 18 18
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.39
Table 6a (Cont.)
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country

























(GH) Currency Crisis Index























2 -0.008 0.653 0.704 0.112 0.341 -0.038 0.696 0.744 0.069 0.274
degrees of freedom 19 18 17 18 18 24 23 22 23 23
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.40
Table 6b
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country














































(GH) Banking Crisis Index
(GH) Twin Crisis Index
adj. R
2 -0.029 0.679 0.695 0.430 0.356 -0.038 0.622 0.650 0.377 0.400
degrees of freedom 27 26 25 26 26 21 20 19 20 20
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.41
Table 6b (Cont.)
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country

























(GH) Currency Crisis Index























2 0.043 0.606 0.617 0.398 0.434 -0.026 0.669 0.693 0.463 0.474
degrees of freedom 21 20 19 20 20 27 26 25 26 26
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.42
Table 6c
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country














































(GH) Banking Crisis Index
(GH) Twin Crisis Index
adj.R
2 -0.031 0.486 0.597 0.543 0.238 -0.032 0.584 0.667 0.552 0.486
degrees of freedom 28 27 26 27 27 22 21 20 21 21
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.43
Table 6c (Cont.)
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves) Estimation: OLS Cross-Country

























(GH) Currency Crisis Index























2 -0.029 0.603 0.690 0.560 0.482 -0.026 0.515 0.646 0.562 0.231
degrees of freedom 22 21 20 21 21 28 27 26 27 27
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.44
Table 7a
De jure versus de facto Exchange Rate Regimes Estimation: OLS Cross-Country






































2 -0.040 0.459 0.539 0.152 -0.041 0.439 0.577 0.145
degrees of freedom 23 22 21 22 23 22 21 22
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.45
Table 7b
De jure versus de facto Exchange Rate Regimes Estimation: OLS Cross-Country







































2 0.208 0.713 0.712 0.243 0.087 0.684 0.723 0.130
degrees of freedom 21 20 19 20 21 20 19 20
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.46
Table 8a
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves)











































(GH) Currency Crisis Index
0.3115*  
(0.0535)
(GH) Banking Crisis Index
0.1701*  
(0.0497)




















2 0.598 0.592 0.580 0.612 0.674 0.580 0.525 0.600 0.587
degrees of freedom 710 504 504 632 338 587 160 656 549
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.47
Table 8b
Reserve Volatility - Vol1 (change in monthly reserves)











































(GH) Currency Crisis Index
0.3232*  
(0.0595)
(GH) Banking Crisis Index
0.1797*  
(0.0504)




















2 0.613 0.608 0.596 0.627 0.689 0.598 0.556 0.616 0.606
degrees of freedom 709 503 503 631 337 586 159 655 548
Note:   Standard errors are given in parentheses and are corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West consistent covariances. 
           *denotes significance at the 5% level.
           The regression´s constant is not shown. See Appendix A2 for definition of the variables.